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The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783


successful resistance, declined to await his adversary's attack under conditions overwhelmingly unfavorable. What shall be said of this talk about provisions? Did not the Comte de Grasse know a month before how long, to a day, the supplies on board would last? Did he not know, four days before Hood sailed, that he had with him every ship he could probably count on for the approaching campaign, while the English would surely be reinforced? And if the English position was as strong as good judgment, professional skill, and bold hearts could make it, had it not weak points? Were not the lee ships to leeward? If they did attempt to beat to windward, had he not ships to "contain" them? If the van ship could not be reached, had he not force enough to double and treble on the third and following ships, as far down the line as he chose? A letter of Suffren's, referring to a similar condition of things at Santa Lucia,[201] but written three years before these events, seems almost a prophetic description of them: --

"Notwithstanding the slight results of the two cannonades of December 15 [1778], we can yet expect success; but the only way to attain it is to attack vigorously the squadron, which in consequence of our superiority cannot hold out, despite their land works, which will become of no effect if we lay them on board, or anchor upon their buoys. If we delay, a thousand circumstances may save them. They may profit by the night to depart."

There can be no doubt that the English would have sold their defeat dearly; but results in war must be paid for, and the best are in the long run the cheapest. A tight grip of a few simple principles -- that the enemy's fleet was the controlling factor in the coming campaign, that it was therefore his true objective, that one fraction of it must be crushed without delay when caught thus separated -- would have saved De Grasse a great blunder; but it is only fair to note that it would have made him an exception to the practice of the French navy.

The hour was now close at hand when the French admiral


[201] See pp. 366, 426.


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